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ABSTRACT	Background:	In	2011,	the	Centers	for	Disease	Control	(CDC)	coined	the	phrase,	“opioid	epidemic”	in	response	to	the	staggering	increase	in	opioid	use	and	opioid-related	deaths.	Kentucky	House	Bill	1	(HB1)	passed	in	2012,	attempted	to	stifle	the	impact	of	the	opioid	epidemic	on	the	citizens	of	the	Commonwealth	by	imposing	supply-side	restrictions	on	the	prescription	and	dispensing	of	opioid	pills.	Objective:	The	primary	objective	of	this	analysis	is	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	HB1	on	the	reduction	of	opioid-related	deaths,	opioid	prescription	rates,	and	intravenous	opioid	drug	use	rates.	Methods:	This	analysis	employed	Eugene	Bardach’s	framework	for	policy	analysis-	the	Eightfold	Path,	to	systematically	assess	the	policy	and	other	options	at	that	time.	Results:	After	HB1	a	decrease	in	the	rate	of	opioid	prescriptions	in	Kentucky	was	observed.	However,	the	rate	of	opioid-related	overdose	deaths	increased.	Discussion/Recommendation:	Supply-side	restrictions	on	opioid	pills	may	lead	to	the	unintended	consequence	of	diversion	to	intravenous	opioid	abuse,	which	carries	even	greater	public	health	implications.	Comprehensive	policy	should	include	both	supply-side	regulations	as	well	as	provisions	for	treatment	and	recovery	for	those	suffering	from	addiction.	
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Introduction	With	hundreds	of	people	dying	each	year	of	opioid-related	overdoses,	states	in	the	US	are	desperately	seeking	effective	strategies	to	curb	the	consequences	of	the	opioid	epidemic.	Now	more	than	ever,	smart	laws	and	practical	policies	are	essential	to	quell	the	devastation	found	across	the	nation.	Kentucky	has	suffered	significant	loss	during	the	last	decade,	and	state	legislators	continually	hope	to	provide	solutions	for	their	constituents.	This	is	a	retrospective	policy	analysis	of	Kentucky	House	Bill	1	(HB1),	passed	in	2012,	which	attempted	to	stifle	the	impact	of	the	opioid	epidemic	on	the	citizens	of	the	Commonwealth	by	imposing	supply-side	restrictions	on	the	prescription	and	dispensing	of	opioid	pills.	The	primary	objective	of	the	analysis	is	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	HB1	on	the	reduction	of	opioid-related	deaths,	opioid	prescription	rates,	and	intravenous	opioid	drug	use	rates.		
Background	
The	Opioid	Epidemic	In	2011,	the	Centers	for	Disease	Control	(CDC)	coined	the	phrase,	“opioid	epidemic”	in	response	to	the	staggering	increase	in	opioid	use	and	opioid-related	deaths.	This	was	not	the	first	wave	of	opioid-related	deaths,	however.	In	the	late	1990s,	Purdue	and	other	pharmaceuticals	began	marketing	prescription	opioids	to	physicians	for	the	use	of	non-cancer-related	pain,	claiming	that	they	had	a	low	risk	of	dependence.1	This	resulted	in	an	increase	in	prescriptions,	addiction,	diversion	(distributing	prescription	pills	to	non-prescribed	users),	and	opioid-related	overdoses.	2		For	
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unknown	reasons,	another	spike	in	opioid	misuse	and	overdose	rates	occurred	in	2010.	This	time,	rather	than	an	increase	in	prescription	opioid	drugs,	a	surge	in	heroin	was	observed.	A	third	wave	occurred	around	2013,	when	misuse	of	synthetic	opioids,	e.g.	Fentanyl,	increased	rapidly	(see	figure	1).		
Figure	1.	3	Waves	of	the	Rise	in	Opioid	Overdose	Deaths	
	To	understand	the	factors	contributing	to	the	epidemic,	one	must	consider	the	pharmacology	of	opioids.	Opioids	are	so-named	because	they	target	opioid	receptors	found	along	the	nervous	system.	Humans	create	endogenous	opioids	in	fact,	called	endorphins	and	enkephalins,	which	are	responsible	for	the	famed	“runner’s	high”.	3	Opioids	are	also	found	outside	the	body,	as	naturally	occurring	substances	found	in	the	poppy	flower,	or	manufactured	synthetic	drugs.	When	
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opioid	substances	bind	to	opioid	receptors,	a	response	is	triggered	that	inhibits	the	transmission	of	pain	signals	to	the	brain.		Opioids	are	not	only	highly	effective	analgesics	(painkillers),	but	they	also	activate	dopaminergic	receptors,	resulting	in	a	pleasurable	response	that	can	potently	reinforce	its	use.	Different	opioids	elicit	varying	levels	of	pleasurable	sensations.	In	addition,	an	individual’s	genetics	also	play	a	role	in	how	pleasant	a	drug	seems,	which	is	termed	“drug	liking”.	3	Opioids	are	the	most	potent	painkillers	in	the	practitioner’s	arsenal,	and	were	historically	used	to	treat	end-of-life	pain	in	cancer	patients.	Around	1999,	the	practice	of	prescribing	opioids	for	non-cancer	pain	became	more	common.	They	were,	and	are	still,	the	drug	of	choice	for	post-surgery	patients	and	trauma	victims.	However,	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	prescribers	began	writing	opioid	prescriptions	for	chronic	pain,	and	it	was	at	this	time	that	the	rise	in	misuse	was	observed.	Contrary	to	the	pharmaceutical	companies’	claims,	opioids	can	be	highly	addictive	substances.	Opioid	addiction	can	be	attributed	to	two	pharmacological	concepts:	tolerance	and	dependence.	First,	the	term	tolerance	refers	to	the	expected	phenomenon	of	requiring	higher	dosages	to	achieve	the	same	effect.	3	For	example,	a	person	may	require	a	certain	amount	of	oxycodone	to	relieve	their	lower	back	pain,	but	in	a	few	weeks,	even	days,	may	require	an	increased	dose	to	relieve	that	same	pain.	For	this	reason,	a	patient	in	this	scenario	could	be	described	as	suffering	from	“pseudo-addiction,”	but	tolerance	is	a	known	and	expected	occurrence.	The	second	concept	is	physical	dependence.	This	is	the	manifestation	of	unpleasant	
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withdrawal	symptoms	upon	the	abrupt	cessation	of	drug	use,	commonly	referred	to	as	“addiction.”	3		 While	the	majority	of	prescription	pain-reliever	users	do	not	misuse	them,	4	their	misuse	has	significant	implications	for	public	health.	Physical	dependence	may	account	for	the	majority	of	adults	who	have	misused	prescription	pain	relievers	reporting	in	2015	that	they	misuse	them	to	relieve	physical	pain	(see	figures	2	and	3).	5	Only	11.7%	reported	misusing	to	“feel	good	or	get	high.”	5		
	
Figure	2.	Past	year	misuse	of	prescription	pain	relievers	among	adults	aged	18	
or	older:	2015		
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Figure	3.	Main	reasons	for	last	episode	of	prescription	pain	reliever	misuse	
among	past	year	misusers	ages	18	or	older:	2015		
Because	of	analgesic	and	pleasure-eliciting	properties	of	opioids,	humans	have	created	multiple	ways	to	use	them.	Methods	of	intake	include	oral	pills,	intravenous	injection	or	infusion,	subcutaneous	injection	(ie.	skin	popping),	snorting	powders,	and	smoking.	6	
Opioid	Overdose	Deaths	Opioids	have	a	depressant	effect	on	the	nervous	system,	which	results	in	the	common	side	effects	of	nausea,	vomiting,	and	constipation,	as	well	as	more	alarming	results	including	sedation	and	respiratory	depression.	Rates	of	overdose,	which	
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simply	refers	to	the	taking	of	a	dangerous	amount	of	substance,	have	continually	increased	each	year	over	the	last	decade	and	a	half,	despite	prescription	rates	decreasing	(see	figure	4).	7		
Figure	4.	Overdose	deaths	involving	opioids,	by	type	of	opioid,	compared	to	
opioid	prescription	rate	
	
The	Opioid	Epidemic	in	Kentucky	Kentucky	has	not	been	spared	the	devastation	of	the	opioid	crisis,	in	fact	it	is	an	epicenter	of	opioid	misuse.	In	2017	alone,	1,565	people	in	the	Commonwealth	died	of	overdoses,	with	opioids	causing	the	vast	majority.	8	The	number	of	overdose	deaths	in	Kentucky	has	increased	each	year	for	the	past	decade.	
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While	the	average	opioid	prescription	rate	in	2012	in	the	US	was	81.3	prescriptions	per	100	persons;	in	Kentucky,	the	rate	was	127.9	per	100	persons	(see	figure	5).	9	
Figure	5.	U.S.	State	Opioid	Prescribing	Rates,	2012	
	
	
House	Bill	1		 To	address	the	opioid	crisis,	Kentucky	House	Bill	1	was	passed	in	the	2012	Special	Session.	It	imposed	restrictions	on	pain	clinics	and	stricter	licensing	board	regulations.	HB1	also	added	requirements	for	physicians	who	prescribe	schedule	2	and	3	drugs,	and	increased	regulations	regarding	the	electronic	prescription	record	(i.e.	KASPER)	usage	and	access.	10	It	also	mandated	an	annual	report,	which	would	detail	the	number	of	drug-related	deaths,	the	drugs	involved,	the	method	by	which	
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the	drugs	were	obtained,	and	statistics	regarding	the	demographics	of	the	decedents.	
	
Methods	An	objective	policy	analysis	will	employ	a	framework	to	offer	an	unbiased	assessment	and	to	be	pertinent	to	audiences	of	all	opinions	and	credos.	For	this	analysis,	the	Eightfold	Path	method	put	forward	by	Eugene	Bardach	at	the	University	of	California	at	Berkeley	was	employed.				
Bardach’s	Eightfold	Path	Bardach	created	a	schema	by	which	to	systematically	approach	the	task	of	analyzing	a	policy.	This	Eightfold	Path	method	consists	of	a	series	of	actions	to	guide	one’s	analysis.		The	first	step	is	“Define	the	problem,”	in	which	the	analyst	focuses	on	the	reason	for	the	policy	in	question.	The	second	step	is	“Assemble	some	evidence.”	Here,	the	analyst	must	gather	data	that	inform	the	circumstances	and	facets	of	the	problem.	The	third	step	is	to	“Construct	the	alternatives”	wherein	one	considers	other	options	that	are	available	to	address	the	problem.	The	fourth	step	is	to	“Select	the	criteria”	by	which	the	analyst	will	judge	the	outcomes	of	each	alternative.	The	fifth	step	is	to	“Project	the	outcomes”	of	each	alternative.	However,	for	this	retrospective	analysis,	the	actual	outcomes	that	occurred	will	be	examined.	The	sixth	step	is	to	“Confront	the	trade-offs,”	weighing	the	pros	and	cons	of	the	outcomes	of	each	alternative.	The	seventh	step	is	to	“Stop,	focus,	narrow,	deepen,	
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decide!”	During	this	step	the	analyst	must	hone	in	on	the	best	few	options	and	dig	deeper	into	them	to	decide	which	is	the	optimal	choice.	The	last	step	is	to	“Tell	your	story,”	communicating	the	results	of	the	analysis	to	the	target	audience.		
Bardach’s	Eight-fold	Path	for	Policy	Analysis	
Step	 Brief	Description	of	Action	
1.	Define	the	problem	 Explain	the	impetus	for	the	policy	
2.	Assemble	some	evidence	 Gather	the	data	surrounding	the	problem	
3.	Construct	the	alternatives	 Describe	the	other	possible	options	available	
4.	Select	the	criteria	 Define	the	standards	by	which	the	options	will	be	judged	
5.	Project	the	outcomes		 Examine	the	results	of	the	policy	options	
6.	Confront	the	trade-offs	 Weight	the	pros	and	cons	of	each	alternative	
7.	Stop,	focus,	narrow,	deepen,	decide!	 Consider	more	closely	the	best	few	options	
8.	Tell	your	story	 Communicate	the	policy	analysis	results	to	target	audience		
Literature	Review	The	literature	review	included	searching	databases,	PubMed	and	Google	Scholar,	by	using	the	following	terms	and	phrases:	opioid	epidemic	(+/-	in	the	United	States	or	in	Kentucky),	opioid	overdose	(+/-	in	the	United	States	or	in	Kentucky),	opioid-related	deaths	in	the	United	States,	heroin-related	deaths,	heroin-related	overdose,	IV	opioid	usage	rates	(+/-	in	the	United	States	or	in	Kentucky),	heroin	usage	rates		(+/-	in	the	United	States	or	in	Kentucky),	opioid	drug	abuse		(+/-	in	the	United	States	or	in	Kentucky),	Kentucky	House	Bill	1.			
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Results	The	first	two	steps	in	Bardach’s	Eightfold	Path	were	addressed	in	the	introduction	portion	of	this	paper.	The	problem	was	defined	as	the	opioid	epidemic	in	Kentucky,	and	the	evidence	gathered	included	a	description	of	the	rates	of	opioid	morbidity	and	mortality	in	Kentucky	and	the	United	States	at	large,	as	well	as	a	portrayal	of	the	Kentucky	House	Bill	1	in	the	2012	Special	Session.	Here,	the	remaining	steps	will	be	examined.			
Construct	the	Alternatives	
Base	Case:	The	base	case	is	the	policy	enacted	by	the	State	Legislature	of	Kentucky	in	2012,	House	Bill	1	(KY	HB	1).	This	bill	enacted	restrictions	on	the	supply-side	of	the	opioid	crisis,	including	multiple	restrictions	and	requirements	related	to	prescription	and	procurement	of	opioid	pills.	Specifically,	it	required	pain	management	clinics	to	have	a	fully-licensed	Medical	Doctor	(M.D)	working	in	a	clinical	capacity	at	least	50%	of	the	time,	to	be	owned	by	an	M.D.,	unless	grandfathered-in,	and	to	accept	insurance	plans.12	It	also	encouraged	inter-agency	reporting	of	drug	infractions,	and	mandated	that	any	licensed	prescriber	who	was	found	to	be	prescribing	unlawfully	be	reported	to	the	Commonwealth’s	Attorney	General.	The	Bill	also	required	various	licensure	boards,	including	Medical,	Nursing,	Dentistry,	Optometry,	and	Podiatry,	to	regulate	prescribing	standards	for	controlled	substances.	This	included	a	48-hour	limit	for	Schedule	II	and	III	hydrocodone	substances,	emergency	suspension	if	licensee	found	to	have	dangerous	prescription	patterns,	expedited	investigation	of	
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any	allegations	of	unlawful	prescribing	by	licensee,	mandatory	reporting	of	past	convictions	related	to	prescribing	controlled	substances,	and	requiring	that	7.5%	of	licensee’s	continuing	medical	education	includes	training	on	addiction	disorders	and	pain	management.	Finally,	the	bill	mandates	an	annual	report	be	published	each	year	detailing	the	number	and	type	of	controlled	substance	overdoses	and	deaths,	per	county.	The	remaining	alternatives	were	the	policies	enacted	by	three	states	surrounding	Kentucky:	Ohio	and	Tennessee.	These	three	states	were	chosen	because	they	are	located	in	the	Appalachian	region,	and	because	of	their	similarities	to	Kentucky	in	population,	socio-economic	status,	and	culture.		
Alternative	1:	The	first	alternative	to	be	examined	is	the	null	alternative.	This	is	the	option	of	doing	nothing,	maintaining	the	status	quo.	This	alternative	opts	not	to	interject	policy	change,	but	rather	see	how	things	“shake	out.”		
Alternative	2:	The	third	alternative	is	the	policy	enacted	by	the	State	Legislature	of	Tennessee,	Senate	Bill	2253,	The	Tennessee	Prescription	Safety	Act	of	2012	(TPSA).	Similarly	to	KY	HB1,	TPSA	imposes	supply-side	regulations	to	decrease	the	number	of	opioid	prescriptions.	It	states	that	every	practitioner	and	pharmacy	must	submit	data	to	a	controlled	substance	database	each	business	day.	13	Interestingly,	it	includes	veterinarians	in	this,	with	the	caveat	that	they	have	seven	days	to	report	to	a	non-
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computer-based	reporting	system.	In	addition,	each	provider	must	look	at	the	database	before	prescribing	controlled	substances	to	their	patient	for	the	first	time,	and	then	annually	after	that,	or	in	the	case	the	provider	suspects	the	patient	of	drug-seeking	behavior	for	the	intent	of	abuse.	The	only	exception	to	this	is	in	the	case	of	prescribing	controlled	substances	in	a	non-refillable	manner	for	the	treatment	of	pain	following	a	surgical	procedure,	not	to	exceed	a	single	7-day	course	of	treatment.	
	
Alternative	3:	In	contrast	to	the	previous	two	legislative	bills,	the	fourth	alternative	was	an	executive	action.	Governor	Kasich	created	the	Governor’s	Cabinet	Opiate	Action	Team	in	2011	to	address	the	early	opioid	epidemic	in	Ohio.	This	75-member,	multidisciplinary	task	force,	led	jointly	by	physicians	and	policymakers,	then	implemented	multiple	regulations.	These	included	guidelines	“created	by	and	for	prescribers”	across	three	different	prescribing	scenarios:	patient	care	in	emergency	department/acute	care	centers,	management	of	chronic	pain,	and	management	of	acute	pain,	such	as	in	the	post-operative	period.	14	The	GCOAT	also	“encouraged”	providers	to	consult	the	Prescription	Drug	Monitoring	Program	(PDMP)	before	prescribing	opioids.	The	goals	of	these	regulations	were	to	encourage	responsible	prescription	of	opioids,	emphasize	preventing	drug	abuse,	and	improve	access	to	treatment.	15	In	an	effort	to	reduce	the	number	of	clinics	that	improperly	dispense	opioid	prescriptions,	“pill	mills,”	the	GCOAT	made	it	mandatory	for	the	Ohio	Board	of	Pharmacy	to	license	all	pain	medicine	clinics	and	illegal	for	any	convicted	felon	to	
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own	or	operate	one.	The	GCOAT	also	initiated	a	“drug	take-back”	program,	wherein	drop	boxes	were	provided	around	the	state	for	the	disposal	of	unused	medications.			
Select	the	Criteria		Three	criteria	were	chosen	to	evaluate	policy	impact:	efficacy,	justice,	and	freedom.	For	this	study,	the	efficacy	refers	to	a	policy’s	ability	to	impact/reduce:	the	rate	of	prescription	of	opioid	pills	and	the	rate	of	opioid-related	overdose	deaths.	For	this	analysis,	a	policy	that	exhibits	freedom	is	one	in	which	the	fewest	regulations	and	restrictions	are	imposed	an	order	to	reap	the	greatest	benefits.		Ideally,	a	policy	would	enact	only	those	regulations	and	restrictions	that	are	necessary	to	achieve	effective	results.	Justice	refers	to	the	equal	distribution	of	restrictions	and	benefits.	For	example,	a	hypothetical	policy	that	heavily	restricts	one	group	of	people	while	benefiting	another	group	of	people	would	not	meet	the	justice	criteria.	Not	only	should	a	policy	employee	the	fewest	regulations	and	restrictions	and	produce	the	greatest	benefit	possible,	but	those	regulations,	restrictions,	and	benefits	should	be	equally	disbursed.	16		
Examine	the	Outcomes,	Confront	the	Trade-offs	In	order	to	be	as	objective	as	possible,	a	criteria–alternatives	matrix	(CAM)	will	be	employed.	This	will	include	examining	each	alternative	as	it	relates	to	the	criteria	listed	above	and	evaluating	how	well	each	policy	alternative	fulfills	each	criterion.			 Each	criterion	will	be	given	a	weight,	such	that	they	add	up	to	1.0,	and	each	policy	will	be	awarded	a	rating	value	for	each	criterion	on	a	scale	of	1-4.			
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Weighting	of	Criteria	Of	the	three	criteria,	Criterion	1:	Efficacy	will	be	weighed	highest	at	0.4.	The	reason	behind	the	heavy	weighting	is	that	the	goal	of	the	policy	is	to	address	the	problem	of	addiction.	Since	it	is	nearly	impossible	to	quantify	addiction,	two	measures	that	approximate	the	problem,	rates	of	opioid	prescriptions	and	rates	of	opioid-related	overdose	deaths	were	used.			 Criterion	2:	Freedom	and	Criterion	3:	Justice	will	be	weighted	at	0.3	each.	This	is	a	subjective	and	highly	politically	charged	ideal,	and	readers	may	disagree	with	the	weight,	whether	that	it	may	be	too	high	or	too	low.	However,	for	this	analysis,	freedom	and	justice	will	be	weighed	equally,	as	they	are	both	considered	to	be	essential	for	the	average	American	citizen.	As	it	is	stated	in	the	Declaration	of	Independence,	liberty	is	an	unalienable	right	in	the	United	States.	It	is	the	position	of	this	analysis	that	the	law	governing	each	citizen	should	be	no	more	restrictive	than	is	necessary	to	achieve	a	solution	that	is	just.	A	policy	that	unduly	restricts	one	group	of	citizens	while	providing	benefits	to	another	group	is	neither	fair	nor	just,	but	it	also	disproportionately	infringes	on	the	freedom	of	the	restricted	group.		
Table	1:	Criterion	Weightings	
Criterion	1:	Efficacy	 0.4	
Criterion	2:	Freedom	 0.3	
Criterion	3:	Justice	 0.3	
Total	 1		
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Table	2:	Rating	Values	
Rating	 Value	
Does	Not	Satisfy	Criteria	 1	
Minimally	Satisfies	Criteria	 2	
Moderately	Satisfies	Criteria	 3	
Satisfies	Criteria	 4	
	
Base	Case:	Efficacy:		How	effective	was	KY	HB1	at	decreasing	opioid	prescriptions,	overdoses,	and	deaths?	According	to	the	CDC,	in	2011,	Kentucky	had	an	opioid	prescription	rate	of	127.9	prescriptions	per	100	persons.	This	dropped	to	110.0	per	100	persons	in	2015.	17	However,	the	opioid-related	overdose	death	rate	increased	from	15.8	per	100,000	persons	in	2011	to	21	per	100,000	persons.	18	It	is	posited	that	the	increase	in	opioid-related	deaths	in	the	setting	of	prescription	opioid	supply	regulations	demonstrates	a	shift	of	abuse	towards	the	less	expensive	and	more	easily	obtainable	“street”	opioids	such	as	heroin.	This	will	be	discussed	in	a	later	section.	Freedom:	 	As	for	the	criterion	of	freedom,	KY	HB1	introduced	restrictions	on	physicians	and	other	opioid	prescribing	providers	and	distributors.	It	created	more	“hoops”	for	providers	to	jump	through	in	order	to	get	their	patients	the	pain-relief	they	needed.	Some	providers	seem	grateful	for	the	increased	restrictions,	as	it	allowed	them	to	limit	access	to	opioids	to	patients	they	believe	no	longer	need	them	without	being	
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the	“bad	guy,”	while	others	complained	it	has	been	difficult	to	give	their	patients	adequate	pain	relief	given	these	regulations.	Justice:	The	last	criterion,	justice,	will	be	examined	based	on	how	the	benefits	and	consequences	were	distributed	among	residents	of	Kentucky.	The	restrictions	of	KY	HB1	limited	the	accessibility	of	prescription	opioids	to	both	the	people	who	used	them	legally	and	illicitly.	Many	providers	may	feel	that	the	onus	has	been	put	on	them	to	regulate	access	to	prescription	opioid	pills,	while	the	consequences	for	those	who	are	already	addicted	are	not	being	addressed.			
Alternative	1:	Efficacy:	While	it	was	impossible	to	predict	the	exact	rates	of	opioid	prescriptions	and	overdose	deaths,	for	this	study,	a	trend	line	based	on	the	five	years	prior	to	the	base	case	was	used	to	extrapolate	these	rates.	Based	on	this	extrapolation,	the	opioid	prescription	rate	in	2015	given	the	status	quo	would	be	approximately	139.5,	and	the	opioid-related	overdose	rate	would	be	17.3	(see	Figures	6	and	7).	Freedom:	The	status	quo	alternative,	wherein	there	is	no	additional	policy	enacted,	and	therefore	no	imposed	restrictions,	seems	to	easily	fulfill	the	criterion	of	freedom.	However,	one	may	argue	that	the	lack	of	regulations	leaves	a	number	of	citizens	at	greater	risk	of	harm	and	thus	decreases	their	freedom.	For	example,	those	patients	who	should	not	be	on	prescription	opioid	pills,	but	are	given	them	by	their	
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physician,	and	who	later	become	addicted	will	suffer	a	lack	of	freedom	because	of	this,	whether	that	be	in	the	form	of	hospitalization	or	fatality.		Justice:	This	alternative,	while	imposing	no	legal	restrictions,	also	gives	little	legal	protections	for	those	who	would	be	impacted	by	opioid	addiction.	One	group	of	citizens	may	benefit	more	greatly	than	another	in	this	scenario.	For	example,	the	costs	associated	with	emergency	services	and	hospitalizations	for	those	who	abuse	opioids	may	be	passed	on	to	those	who	do	not.	
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Alternative	2:	Efficacy:	The	TPSA	of	2012	in	Tennessee,	another	supply-side	regulatory	bill,	similarly	decreased	Tennessee’s	prescription	opioid	rate	from	138.5	prescriptions	per	100	persons	in	2011	to	114.9	in	2015.	In	addition,	Tennessee	also	saw	an	increase	in	opioid-related	overdose	deaths	from	16.6	per	100,000	persons,	age	adjusted,	in	2011	to	22	in	2015.	19	Freedom:	Again,	the	Tennessee	policy	restricted	providers	and	therefore	limited	accessibility	of	opioid	prescriptions	to	patients.	It	quite	literally	put	a	cap	on	the	length	of	treatment	providers	were	allowed	to	prescribe	opioid	analgesics	to	their	patients.	In	this	sense,	it	took	away	the	right	of	the	physician	to	do	what	they	felt	was	best	for	the	patient,	given	their	clinical	judgment.			Justice:	Similarly	to	KY	HB1,	the	TPSA	regulated	providers,	rather	than	those	who	might	be	actively	abusing	opioids.	While	it	may	have	decreased	the	number	of	prescriptions	being	written,	this	did	not	help	those	who	were	already	addicted.	In	fact,	as	briefly	alluded	to	before,	making	it	harder	for	addicts	to	obtain	regulated	prescriptions	opioids	may	have	incentivized	them	to	seek	out	unregulated	street	forms	of	opioids,	such	as	heroin.		
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Alternative	3:	Efficacy:	Ohio	employed	the	Governor’s	Cabinet	Opiate	Action	Team	(GCOAT)	and	had	success	in	decreasing	the	prescription	of	opioid	pills,	from	101.5	prescriptions	per	100	persons	in	2011	to	82.7	in	2015.	However,	it	had	issues	similar	to	KY	and	TN	with	regards	to	increasing	overdose	death	rates.	In	fact,	opioid	deaths	in	Ohio	nearly	
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doubled	from	11.2	opioid-related	overdose	deaths	per	100,000	persons	in	2011	to	24.7	in	2015.	Freedom:	This	policy	option,	while	still	regulating	prescription	providers,	included	them	in	the	discussion	and	leadership	of	the	GCOAT.	It	relied	not	only	on	restrictions,	but	also	employed	education	and	options	for	addiction	recovery.	Justice:	While	GCOAT	did	place	fairly	heavy	restrictions	on	the	prescription	of	opioid	analgesics	by	providers,	it	also	gave	providers	an	avenue	to	address	addiction	prevention	and	recovery	with	their	patients.	Those	who	were	already	addicted	were	educated	also	through	public	service	announcements	and	school	initiatives,	allowing	them	to	understand	they	had	options	for	treatment.		
	
	
Table	5:	Number	of	Opioid	Prescriptions	Per	100	Persons	
Source:	CDC			
		 2011	 2015	
Kentucky	 137	 102.6	
Tennessee	 138.5	 114.9	
Ohio	 101.5	 82.7	
Table	6:	Rate	of	Opioid-Related	Overdose	Deaths	per	100,000	Persons,	Age	
Adjusted	
Source:	CDC			
		 2011	 2015	
Kentucky	 137	 102.6	
Tennessee	 138.5	 114.9	
Ohio	 101.5	 82.7	
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Table	7:	Qualitative	Outcomes	Matrix	
Cr
it
er
ia
	
Alternatives	
	 Base	Case:	KY	
HB	1	
Alternative	1:		
Status	Quo	
Alternative	2:	
TPSA	
Alternative	3:	
GCOAT	
Criterion	1:	
Efficacy	
Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	 Does	Not	Satisfy	Criterion	 Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	 Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	
Criterion	2:	
Freedom	
Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	 Moderately	Satisfies	Criterion	 Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	 Moderately	Satisfies	Criterion	
Criterion	3:	
Justice	
Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	 Does	Not	Satisfy	Criterion	 Minimally	Satisfies	Criterion	 Moderately	Satisfies	Criterion		
Table	8:	Quantitative	Outcomes	Matrix	
Criteria	 Alternatives		 Alternative	2:	
KY	HB	1	
Alternative	1:	
Null	
Alternative	3:	
TPSA	
Alternative	4:	
GCOAT	
Criterion	1:	
Efficacy	
(0.40)	
2	x	0.4	=	0.8	 1	x	0.4=	0.4	 2	x	0.4	=	0.8	 2	x	0.4	=	0.8	
Criterion	2:	
Freedom	
(0.30)	
2	x	0.3	=	0.6	 3	x	0.3	=	0.9	 2	x	0.3	=	0.6	 3	x	0.3	=	0.9	
Criterion	3:	
Justice	
(0.3)	
2	x	0.3	=	0.6	 1x	0.3	=	0.3	 2	x	0.3	=	0.6	 3	x	0.3	=	0.9	
Total	Score:	 2.0	 1.6	 2.0	 2.6		Using	the	Criteria	Alternatives	Matrix	(see	Tables	7	and	8),	the	policy	action	put	forward	by	Ohio	received	the	highest	overall	score,	followed	by	Kentucky’s	and	Tennessee’s	policies,	which	were	tied.	The	lowest-scoring	policy	was	that	of	the	“status	quo.”			
Discussion	
Stop,	Focus,	Narrow,	Deepen,	Decide;	Tell	Your	Story	As	demonstrated	above,	Alternatives	2,3,4	were	efficacious	in	decreasing	the	number	of	opioid	prescriptions	in	their	respective	states.	This	is	important	because	
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it	has	been	estimated	that	the	rate	of	opioid	prescriptions	is	related	to	the	rate	of	addiction.	20	The	majority	of	people	addicted	to	opioid	drugs	were	introduced	via	opioid	pills.	21	Not	all,	but	most	were	legally	prescribed	those	opioid	pills.	21	A	common	scenario	where	prescription	opioids	led	to	addiction	is:	a	physician	prescribes	a	patient	oral	opioid	medication	following	surgery;	after	a	period	of	time	the	patient	experiences	increased	tolerance	and	dependence,	becoming	“addicted”	to	the	opioid	analgesia.	Here	is	an	illustration,	based	upon	an	actual	patient	of	the	author.	Names	have	been	changed	to	protect	privacy.			
The	Creation	of	an	Addict	Jane	Doe	is	in	a	car	accident	and	suffers	back	pain	from	her	acute	injury.	She	is	prescribed	IV	opioid	analgesia	while	inpatient	in	the	hospital,	and	then	oral	opioid	medication	after	her	hospitalization.	She	is	unable	to	wean	herself	from	the	pills,	either	because	of	tolerance	or	lack	of	other	analgesic	support,	such	as	the	use	of	non-steroidal	anti-inflammatories	like	ibuprofen.	She	notices	that	when	she	decreases	or	stops	the	opioid	medication,	she	begins	to	feel	irritable	and	other	symptoms	of	withdrawal.	On	top	of	that,	she	notices	the	same	dose	of	medication	isn’t	“doing	the	trick,”	and	she	must	continually	increase	her	dosage	and/or	frequency.	In	addition,	she	is	unable	to	return	to	work	due	to	her	back	pain	and/or	restrictions	while	under	the	influence	of	opioid	medication.	Because	of	this,	she	is	extremely	sensitive	to	changes	in	her	levels	of	pain	and	symptoms	of	withdrawal,	without	work	to	distract	her.		
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Her	physician	prescribes	her	pills	for	a	while	until	he	or	she	becomes	uncomfortable,	at	which	point	Jane	begs	for,	and	is	given,	one	more	prescription.	After	that	she	is	cut	off.	She	however	was	unable	to	wean	herself,	so	when	her	fingers	grasp	the	last	pill	in	the	bottle,	she	wonders	where	and	how	she	will	get	another	dose.	After	all,	she	experiences	real,	intensely	unpleasant	symptoms	when	she	goes	without.	So,	she	goes	to	other	physicians,	and	if	she’s	“lucky,”	they	won’t	ask	too	many	questions	and	will	give	her	another	script	for	the	opioids.	This	tides	her	over	until	no	physician	is	willing	to	prescribe	her	any	more.		At	this	point,	she	becomes	fraught	and	seeks	out	a	friend-of-a-friend	whom	she	has	heard	has	pills	for	sale.	She	is	shocked	to	find	out	that	while	her	prescription	pills	cost	around	$6	per	pill,	this	dealer	is	charging	$50-$100	per	pill.	After	a	while,	she	can	no	longer	afford	these	black	market	pills,	but	is	even	more	tolerant	and	dependent,	requiring	more	and	more	pills	to	create	the	same	effect	and	stave	of	symptoms	of	withdrawal.		Her	world	begins	to	revolve	around	acquiring	and	using	opioids.	It	becomes	an	obsession	that	takes	over	her	life,	and	she	could	lose	everything	in	her	life	to	this	fixation.		
Supply-Side	Restrictions	Legislators	have	been	very	willing	to	curtail	the	casual	prescription	of	opioids.	It	seems	clear	that	if	physicians	wouldn’t	prescribe	so	many	pills,	patients	wouldn’t	become	addicted	at	the	rate	they	are.	Having	a	law	that	limits	opioid	prescriptions	makes	it	easier	for	physicians	to	“just	say	no”	to	prescribing	any	more	than	minimum	doses	and	short	courses	of	opioids.	Legal	restrictions	give	non-pain-
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management	physicians	an	“easy	out”	when	they	would	have	been	uncomfortable	prescribing	these	analgesics.	“I’m	sorry,	I’m	bound	by	this	limitation	in	Kentucky”	is	easier	to	say	than,	“I	don’t	want	to	give	you	more.”		 However,	with	supply-side	regulations	and	drug	prohibition	has	come	diversion,	which	carries	numerous	dangers.	Drugs	obtained	on	the	black	market	are	unregulated	and	expensive.	When	demand	increases,	the	pills	become	more	expensive	and/or	adulterated	to	increase	quantity.	Black	market	oral	opioid	pills	can	cost	10	to	20	times	the	cost	of	their	insurance-covered	counterparts.	In	addition,	substances	can	be	expired,	contaminated,	or	intentionally	“cut”	with	other,	less	expensive	chemicals	to	increase	the	bulk	of	supply.		
Trading	Pills	for	Needles	Users	who	are	addicted	to	prescription	opioid	pills	may	turn	to	other	forms	of	opioids	when	their	supply	is	cut	off	or	using	pills	becomes	too	expensive.	When	this	happens,	other,	more	serious	complications	may	arise.	The	illustration	of	Jane,	the	patient-turned-addict	begun	above	will	continue	to	exhibit	this	phenomenon.	Seeing	Jane’s	desperation,	the	dealer	informs	her	that	he	has	another	opioid	option	she	could	use.	One	that	is	much	cheaper	at	only	$10	per	hit:	heroin.	If	one	had	asked	Jane	years	earlier	if	she	would	ever	use	intravenous	drugs,	she	may	have	laughed	incredulously.	But	now,	her	body	sends	her	severe	and	almost	unbearable	signals	that	she	is	dependent	on	the	drug.	Her	mu	opioid	receptors	have	become	more	and	more	desensitized	to	binding	with	opioids,	requiring	that	she	take	larger	and	more	frequent	doses	to	feel	“normal,”	let	alone,	“good.”	
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So	she	begins	injecting	the	substance	her	dealer	gives	her.	The	concentrations	vary	with	each	“hit.”	She	has	no	way	of	knowing	what	exactly	it	is	that	she	is	injecting.	Sometimes	she	feels	the	effects	of	other	unknown	substances.	There	is	no	quality	control	among	illicit	drug	manufacturing	and	distributors.	Whatever	she	is	injecting,	it	certainly	isn’t	sterile.	Neither	are	her	needles.	She	uses	needles	repeatedly,	and	sometimes	without	cleaning	them	in	between	uses.	Sometimes,	she	borrows	a	needle	from	another	user.	Another	user	taught	her	how	to	inject	into	a	vein,	but	it’s	hard	to	do	it	to	oneself,	and	sometimes	she	misses.	Sometimes	she	simply	injects	it	under	her	skin	or	into	muscle,	what	she’s	been	told	is	called	“skin	popping.”		She	begins	to	care	little	about	anything	else	besides	the	next	“hit.”	Her	body	aches	and	anxiety	overcomes	her.	Her	heart	races	and	her	hands	begin	to	tremble.	She	feels	nauseated	and	vomits	repeatedly;	cramping	abdominal	pain	doubles	her	over.	She	is	restless	and	sweating,	and	maybe	worst	of	all,	she	cannot	sleep.	It	feels	like	a	rapidly	occurring	flu	each	time	she	tries	to	abstain.	However,	all	the	pain,	anxiety,	tremulousness,	and	nausea	disappear	nearly	instantaneously	as	she	takes	the	next	dose.	One	time,	she	injects	herself	with	a	new	batch	from	her	dealer.	She	wakes	up	in	an	ambulance	with	paramedics	yelling	at	her	to	wake	up.	She	is	lucid	for	the	next	hour	as	she	sits	in	the	hallway	in	the	closest	hospital’s	emergency	room.	She	loses	consciousness	again	only	to	be	awoken	with	a	doctor	and	nurse	standing	over	her.	Narcan,	the	drug	that	reverses	opioid	overdose,	doesn’t	last	as	long	as	the	opioid	in	her	veins.	She	has	to	be	watched	for	a	few	hours	after	that	before	she	is	released.	A	
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few	weeks	after,	she	receives	a	bill	from	the	hospital	for	an	amount	that	equals	tens	of	dozens	of	“hits,”	and	without	a	job,	she	has	no	way	to	pay	even	if	she	chose	to.	A	month	later,	she	notices	a	large	boil	forming	on	her	left	shoulder.	It	continues	to	grow,	though	she	has	tried	to	drain	it	many	times.	It	is	followed	by	other	sores	that	erupt	on	her	arms.	There	are	so	many	it	is	hard	to	even	find	a	place	to	stick	herself.		After	weeks	of	dealing	with	the	lesions,	she	begins	to	feel	cold	and	clammy,	lethargic,	and	short	of	breath.	She	takes	her	temperature	and	has	a	fever,	so	she	calls	an	ambulance	for	help.	Jane	is	brought	to	the	hospital	where	she	is	diagnosed	with	endocarditis.	Bacteria	from	the	outside	world	entered	her	blood	stream	when	she	injected	with	a	“dirty”	needle,	and	traveled	to	and	infected	her	heart.	She	has	to	be	kept	in	the	hospital	for	six	full	weeks	on	intravenous	antibiotics	in	order	to	live.	While	there,	she	is	told	she	is	HIV	positive	and	must	begin	a	complex	regimen	of	medications	that	she	will	be	on	for	the	rest	of	her	life.	When	she	is	discharged	she	is	told	to	follow	up	with	a	doctor	in	clinic,	but	can’t	get	to	the	appointment	because	she	sold	her	car	to	pay	for	dope.	She	never	fills	her	prescriptions	for	her	HIV	medications	because	she	has	no	job,	no	money,	and	no	insurance.			
Unintended	Consequences	Patients	who	become	addicted	to	prescription	opioid	pills	and	are	then	cut	off	from	them	will	turn	to	other	avenues.	Once	their	body	has	developed	tolerance	and	dependence,	their	brain	has	quite	literally	been	altered,	by	the	desensitization	of	their	opioid	receptors.	It	is	not	exaggeration	to	say	that	at	a	certain	level	of	
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dependence	human	brains	are	reprogrammed	to	be	drug-seeking	machines.	The	symptoms	of	withdrawal	are	similar	to	those	of	influenza,	minus	the	cough	and	congestion.	They	can	be	nearly	unbearable	for	most	people	to	endure.	It	is	no	wonder	that	addicted	individuals	turn	to	the	cheaper	and	easily	available	injectable	opioids.			 Injectable	opioids	are	fraught	with	danger,	from	the	uncertainty	of	their	contents,	to	their	method	of	abuse.	Confiscated	heroin	has	been	found	to	have	many	other	ingredients	added	to	it	upon	testing.	Baby,	and	other,	powders	are	added	for	bulk.	Fentanyl,	methamphetamines,	and	even	benzodiazepines,	along	with	other	substances,	have	been	found.	In	addition,	drugs	that	are	administered	intravenously	in	the	hospital	are	carefully	regulated,	stored,	mixed,	and	infused	in	such	a	way	to	preserve	sanitation.			 The	use	of	skin-popping	and	other	unsterilized	routes	of	injection,	including	sharing	and	re-using	“dirty”	needles	carries	its	own	consequences,	regardless	of	what	is	being	injected.	Soft	tissue	and	skin	infection	in	IV	drug	users	is	a	known	complication.	22	Septic	emboli,	tiny	masses	of	infection	that	block	off	arteries,	causes	necrosis	of	whatever	tissue	they	were	supplying.	Endocarditis,	wherein	bacteria	travel	to	the	heart	and	disrupt	the	functioning	of	the	heart	valves	is	fatal	without	treatment,	and	leaves	lasting	consequences	even	when	the	original	infection	is	cleared.	Sharing	needles	transmits	deadly	infectious	diseases	like	HIV	and	Hepatitis	C,	and	their	sequelae	are	devastating.	23	
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	 It	has	been	shown	that	IV	drug	users	utilize	the	healthcare	system	at	higher	rates	than	patients	who	are	not.	23	These	patients	constitute	a	considerable	burden	on	the	healthcare	economy,	as	they	are	often	quite	complex	and	often	uninsured.	23		 Considering	all	this,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	unintended	consequence	of	supply-side	regulations	pushing	addicts	towards	black	market	and	IV	drugs.		
	
Conclusion/	Recommendation	It	appears	that	all	of	the	above-mentioned	policies,	excepting	Alternative	1,	employed	chiefly	supply-side	regulations	and	restrictions.	While	these	policies	have	been	associated	with	decreased	opioid	prescription	rates,	increased	opioid-related	overdose	deaths	were	also	observed.	This	was	certainly	not	the	intent,	but	insufficient	attention	was	given	to	those	citizens	that	were	already	dependent	on	opioids	at	the	time	of	legislation.	Only	in	the	case	of	GCOAT	in	Ohio	were	addiction	recovery	measures	taken.		
	 Thought	must	be	given	to	those	who	are	already	addicted,	as	it	has	been	shown	that	they	may	divert	to	street	drugs	when	cut	off	from	prescriptions.	In	order	to	reduce	opioid-related	overdoses,	drug	treatment	options	should	be	brought	to	the	forefront.	Safeguards	should	be	put	in	place	to	prevent	the	spread	of	blood-borne	illnesses	and	other	infective	sequelae	of	intravenous	drug	use,	such	as	clean	syringe	exchanges.	Protections	should	be	given	to	encourage	those	who	witness	an	overdose	to	call	emergency	services.	Naloxone,	the	opioid-reversal	medication,	should	be	made	readily	available	to	first	responders	and	those	who	receive	opioid	prescriptions.	
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	 Since	2015,	Kentucky	has	implemented	more	comprehensive	plans	to	quell	the	opioid	epidemic.	24	Time	will	tell	if	these	measures	are	capable	of	reducing	what	really	matters-	saving	constituents	from	the	consequences	of	opioid	addiction	and	overdose	deaths.	
Final	Recommendations	
	 In	creating	policy	to	address	the	Opioid	Epidemic,	four	objectives	should	be	pursued:	
1. Decrease	unnecessary	prescription	of	opioid	medication	a. Utilize	the	knowledge	and	partnership	of	physicians	in	creating	guidelines	for	the	proper	prescription	of	these	medications	b. Support	providers	in	educating	their	patients	on	the	risks	of	opioid	prescription	usage	c. Incentivize	use	of	non-opioid	pain	management	techniques	2. Provide	avenues	of	treatment	for	those	citizens	suffering	from	addiction	a. Provide	comprehensive	addiction	treatment	and	recovery	facilities	and	programs	at	little	cost	to	the	patient.	The	costs	of	addiction	and	its	complications	far	outweigh	the	costs	of	providing	these	services.	b. Establish	addiction	recovery	clinics	that	dispense	buprenorphine	and	methadone	in	areas	of	high	opioid	abuse	rates	3. Employ	strategies	to	reduce	the	complications	of	intravenous	drug	use	a. Establish	clean	syringe	exchange	programs	in	areas	of	high	opioid	abuse	rates	
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4. Equip	first	responders	and	average	citizens	with	the	tools	to	combat	drug	overdose	and	prevent	overdose	deaths	a. Provide	naloxone	to	all	first	responders,	patients	with	an	opioid	prescription,	and	to	volunteers	that	request	it	b. Give	legal	immunity	to	those	that	report	overdoses	in	order	to	encourage	swift	treatment	
A	comprehensive	opioid	policy	should	be	employed	in	order	to	do	what	matters	most:	reduce	the	morbidity	and	mortality	of	opioid	abuse	and	addiction.	
														
	 34	
References:	1. Van	Zee,	Art.	“The	Promotion	and	Marketing	of	Oxycontin:	Commercial	Triumph,	Public	Health	Tragedy.”	American	Journal	of	Public	Health,	American	Public	Health	Association,	Feb.	2009,	www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2622774/.	2. Bohnert,	Amy	S.	B.	“Association	Between	Opioid	Prescribing	Patterns	and	Opioid	Overdose-Related	Deaths.”	Jama,	vol.	305,	no.	13,	2011,	p.	1315.,	doi:10.1001/jama.2011.370.	3. Pergolizzi,	Joseph	V.,	et	al.	“The	Basic	Pharmacology	of	Opioids	Informs	the	Opioid	Discourse	about	Misuse	and	Abuse:	A	Review.”	Pain	and	Therapy,	vol.	6,	no.	1,	2017,	pp.	1–16.,	doi:10.1007/s40122-017-0068-3.	4. Hughes,	A.,	Williams,	M.	R.,	Lipari,	R.	N.,	Bose,	J.,	Copello,	E.	A.	P.,	&	Kroutil,	L.	A.	(2016,	September).	“Prescription	drug	use	and	misuse	in	the	United	States:	
Results	from	the	2015	National	Survey	on	Drug	Use	and	Health.”	NSDUH	Data	Review.	Retrieved	from	https://samhsa.gov/data/		5. Lipari,	Rachel.	Why	Do	Adults	Misuse	Prescription	Drugs?	SAMHSA,	2017,	Why	
Do	Adults	Misuse	Prescription	Drugs?	6. National	Institute	on	Drug	Abuse.	“What	Is	Heroin	and	How	Is	It	Used?”	NIDA,	www.drugabuse.gov/publications/research-reports/heroin/what-heroin.	7. Kolodny,	Andrew,	et	al.	“The	Prescription	Opioid	and	Heroin	Crisis:	A	Public	Health	Approach	to	an	Epidemic	of	Addiction.”	Annual	Review	of	Public	
Health,	vol.	36,	no.	1,	2015,	pp.	559–574.,	doi:10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031914-122957.	
	 35	
8. Kentucky	Office	of	Drug	Control	Policy.	2017	Overdose	Fatality	Report.	COMMONWEALTH	OF	KENTUCKY	JUSTICE	&	PUBLIC	SAFETY	CABINET,	2017.	9. “U.S.	Opioid	Prescribing	Rate	Maps”	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	
Prevention,	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	3	Oct.	2018,	www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html	10. “House	Bill	1	Information.”	House	Bill	1	Information	-	Kentucky	Board	of	
Medical	Licensure,	kbml.ky.gov/hb1/Pages/default.aspx.	11. Bardach,	Eugene,	and	Eric	M.	Patashnik.	A	Practical	Guide	for	Policy	Analysis:	
the	Eightfold	Path	to	More	Effective	Problem	Solving.	CQ	Press,	2019.	12. KENTUCKY	BOARD	OF	MEDICAL	LICENSURE	SUMMARY	OF	HB	1.	www.kbml.ky.gov,	2012,	KENTUCKY	BOARD	OF	MEDICAL	LICENSURE	
SUMMARY	OF	HB	1.	13. “Tennessee	SB2552.”	TrackBill,	trackbill.com/bill/tennessee-senate-bill-2552-drugs-prescription-as-enacted-enacts-the-tennessee-prescription-safety-act-of-2016-which-revises-regulation-of-controlled-substances-makes-permanent-most-all-of-the-changes-made-under-the-tennessee-prescription-safety-act-of-2012-and-revises-and-enacts-other-provisions-amends-tca-title-53-chapter-10-title-63-chapter-1-chapter-791-of-the-public-acts-of-2014-and-chapter-880-of-the-public-acts-of-2012/1240426/.	14. 	“Ohio	Partners	Work	Together	to	Reduce	the	Flow	of	Prescribed	Opiates.”	SAMHSA,	www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/ohio-partners-work-together.	
	 36	
15. 	“Combating	Opioid	Abuse	through	a	Unified	State	and	Local	Response:	The	Ohio	Governor's	Cabinet	Opiate	Action.”	Center	for	Health	Care	Strategies,	30	May	2018,	www.chcs.org/resource/combating-opioid-abuse-through-a-unified-state-and-local-response-the-ohio-governors-cabinet-opiate-action/.	16. Oliver,	Thomas	R.	“The	Politics	Of	Public	Health	Policy.”	Annual	Review	of	
Public	Health,	vol.	27,	no.	1,	2006,	pp.	195–233.,	doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.25.101802.123126.	17. “Opioid	Overdose.”	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	Centers	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	31	July	2017,	www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxstate2011.html.	18. National	Institute	on	Drug	Abuse.	“Kentucky	Opioid	Summary.”	NIDA,	28	Feb.	2018,	www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state/kentucky-opioid-summary.	19. National	Institute	on	Drug	Abuse.	“Tennessee	Opioid	Summary.”	NIDA,	29	Mar.	2019,	www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state/tennessee-opioid-summary.	20. “Trends	in	Opioid	Analgesic	Abuse	and	Mortality	in	the	United	States.”	New	
England	Journal	of	Medicine,	vol.	372,	no.	16,	2015,	pp.	1572–1574.,	doi:10.1056/nejmc1501822.	21. Cicero,	Theodore	J.,	et	al.	“The	Changing	Face	of	Heroin	Use	in	the	United	States.”	JAMA	Psychiatry,	vol.	71,	no.	7,	2014,	p.	821.,	doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2014.366.	
	 37	
22. Ebright,	John	R,	and	Barbara	Pieper.	“Skin	and	Soft	Tissue	Infections	in	Injection	Drug	Users.”	Infectious	Disease	Clinics	of	North	America,	vol.	16,	no.	3,	2002,	pp.	697–712.,	doi:10.1016/s0891-5520(02)00017-x.	23. “Hospitalizations	for	Endocarditis	and	Associated	Health	Care	Costs	Among	Persons	With	Diagnosed	Drug	Dependence—North	Carolina,	2010-2015.”	Annals	of	Emergency	Medicine,	vol.	70,	no.	4,	2017,	pp.	576–578.,	doi:10.1016/j.annemergmed.2017.07.479.	24. Kentucky	Legislative	Research	Commission.	“SB	192	Kentucky	General	Assembly.”	19RS	SB	192,	apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/19RS/sb192.html.				
	
